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Abstract
The quest to gain market share within an industry is argued to drive Decision 
Making Units (DMUs) to accommodate more risk. The cross sectional varia-
tions in risk taking is believed to be influenced by the position of the DMU in 
the industry, with those on the lower end assuming more risk in order to gain 
market share. On the other hand, less competition among banks could result 
in higher interest rates being charged on business loans, which might raise the 
credit risk of borrowers as a result of moral hazard issues. The South African 
highly concentrated banking sector presents an opportunity to econometrically 
investigate such issues. Panel estimation techniques are employed on the South 
African banking sector unique data set. The model explores the relationship be-
tween the specified bank risk measure and bank market concentration measure, 
controlling for individual bank characteristics and the state of the economy. We 
find that smaller banks in South African concentrated banking sector are more 
exposed to credit risk than bigger banks. However, considering the interaction 
between size and concentration measure, bigger banks in highly concentrated 
industry are more likely to have high credit risk, in line with the concentration 
fragility hypothesis. Findings have implications for both policy and manage-
ment of individual banks.
Keywords: Industry concentration; Bank risk-taking; Credit risk; South 
Africa
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1. Introduction and background
The structure of the South African banking sector is unique- highly sophisticat-
ed financial sector and a highly concentrated banking sector. In the past years 
the sector leaders (big four1) have witnessed surmountable pressure from the 
previously smaller banks like Capitec. However, when asked his perception on 
losing market share to Capitec bank, Nedbank CEO (Mr Mike Brown) argued 
that focus should not be on increasing market share only, rather on the quality of 
business created (Lefifi, June 16, 2013). Such quest for increasing market share 
by smaller banks, and competition to maintaining high share among the ‘big 
four’ have had its share of scrutiny both in the academic and industry spheres 
(see for example, Okeahalam, 1998). Keely (1990) and Kouki and Al-Nasser 
(2014) agree that competition can be detrimental to the economy through ero-
sion of franchise value, as well as incentivising banks to take more risk. On the 
contrary, Boyd, De Nicoló and Al Jalal, (2006) and Boyd and De Nicoló, (2005) 
argue that competition (less concentration) is good for financial stability. This 
implies that the effect of concentration on risk taking (stability versus fragility) 
is dependent on the specific sector and cannot easily be generalised to other 
economies.
On the other hand, Suarez (1994) showed that there is a trade-off between 
market power and solvency, implying that if the market power of the bank de-
creases, the incentive to engage in riskier policies increases significantly. Fur-
thermore, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)noted large literature that concludes that, 
when confronted with increased  competition, banks rationally choose more 
risky portfolios. On the other hand,Verhoef (2009) argued that the persistent 
high degree of concentration inherent in the South African banking sector, is 
predominantly as a result of the risk related capital and liquid asset requirements 
enforced globally by partiesto the Basel Accords2.
Given that the cross sectional variations in risk taking is believed to be influ-
enced by the market share position of the decision making unit (DMU) in the 
industry, with those on the lower end assuming more risk in order to gain mar-
ket share, it is necessary to test this in a compelling environment like the South 
African banking sector. Banks are exposed to credit risk through their income 
generating process of credit creation (see Kargi, 2011). The Basel Committee on 
1 Alphabetically: Amalgamated Bank of South Africa-ABSA (Barclays Africa); First National Bank 
(FNB); Nedbank and Standard Bank of South Africa.
2 South Africa is one of the emerging and developing countries that keenly comply with the Basel Ac-
cords recommendations
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Banking Supervision (2001) defined credit risk as the possibility of losing the 
outstanding loan partially or totally, due to credit events (default risk). It is im-
perative to note that, credit risk is an internal determinant of bank performance. 
The higher the exposure of a bank to credit risk, the higher the propensity of the 
bank to experience financial crisis and vice-versa.
The argument stems from the work of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) who noted 
that less competition, which is expected to be a characteristic of highly concen-
trated sector, among banks could result in higher interest rates being charged on 
business loans that would raise the credit risk of borrowers as a result of moral 
hazard issues. Apparently, the increased default risk could result in an increase 
in problem loans (heightened loan loss provision could be witnessed) and thus 
greater bank instability. Contrary to this view, and showing lack of consensus 
in literature on this topic, Jimenez, et al. (2013) concluded that the underlying 
source of franchise value is typically assumed to be market power, and market 
concentration has been considered to promote banking stability.
Despite the plausibility of the link between market concentration and high 
risk appetite among entities, research in this area is very scant. Furthermore 
available literature has a number of limitations, for example focusing on devel-
oped economies, outside the financial crisis, having a multi-country analysis 
without controlling for different market structures (see for example, Cipollini & 
Fiordelisi, 2009). Given this background, this study attempts to overcome the 
limitations of existing studies and add to South African literature in a number 
of ways: considering an emerging economy, focusing on one country with its 
unique characteristics to avoid loss of information in generalisation and using 
panel data analysis techniques compared to cross-sectional analysis.  In the con-
text of South African banking sector, with high concentration rates, a system 
that proved resilience to the 2008/09 global financial crisis and a sophisticated 
financial market, we thus hypothesise that there is a statistically positive associ-
ation between industry concentration and risk taking.
 The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 presents the structure 
of the South African banking industry, followed by sections 3 and 4 which deal 
with the review of the theoretical literature and empirical literature, respective-
ly. Section five covers methodology and data, while section six presents the 
empirical results and their discussion. Lastly section seven summarises and pro-
vides a conclusion to the study. 
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2. The structure of the South African banking industry 
The South African banking sector is developed and well regulated. It compares 
favourably with those of industrialised countries. The industry is made up of 
19 registered banks, 2 mutual banks, 13 local branches of foreign banks, and 
43 foreign banks (Banking Association of South Africa (BASA), 2011).To date 
back to history briefly, Verhoef (2009) reports that the formal financial sector 
was historically dominated by an “oligopoly” of British-owned banks (Standard 
Bank and Barclays Bank, for example).. Whilst the micro-lending sector, offer-
ing mostly smaller and short-term loans, grew exponentially in the 1990s, run 
mostly by Afrikaans-speaking former civil servants, (examples of the consoli-
dated versions of these are African Bank and Capitec) (James, 2014).
The South African banking-sector is dominated by the four largest banks, 
which contribute over 84 per cent to the balance-sheet size of the banking sec-
tor of 19 banks, explaining the current high concentration within the industry 
calculated using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The higher the index, 
the lesser is the competition that exists in the market. An H-H index below 0.1 
indicates that there is no concentration in an industry, while an HHI between 0.1 
and 0.18 is an indication of moderate concentration. The South African Reserve 
Bank Annual Reports, from 1994 to 2011 shows that the South African banking 
sector HHI amounted to over 0.18 since 2004, and was never below 0.1 over 
the period under review. An HHI above 0.18 represents a highly concentrated 
industry that indicates the presence of oligopoly behaviour and this is the case 
of the South African banking sector.
Among the big four banks in South Africa, Standard bank is the largest bank 
in terms of assets, with a market share of 26 percent, followed by ABSA with 
22 percent. FNB and Nedbank had a market share of about 19 percent and 18 
percent respectively as of that date (BASA, 2011). The South African banking 
sector is thus unique, and therefore an interesting case for testing the effect of 
concentration on industry stability through determining link between concentra-
tion and risk taking.
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3. Theoretical literature review
3.1 Conceptualising competition in the banking sector
The common measure of concentration which is also used by the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) for competition in the South African banking sector is 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for concentration. Market concentration 
measures the extent to which market power is likely to be pronounced in a 
single supplier, or group of suppliers. Organisation of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) (2010) noted that measuring competition in finan-
cial markets is complex due to their peculiar features, such as switching costs. 
OECD then identifies three approaches that have been used to measure compe-
tition in the banking sector, as follows:
 3.1.1 Structural measures of competition
The widely used measures in empirical work are concentration ratios, the num-
ber of banks and HHI. These measures originated in the structure-conduct-per-
formance (SCP) paradigm linking the structure of a market to influences on firm 
behaviour and thus sector performance. See for example, Berger et al. (2004).
One prediction of the SCP approach is that higher concentration would encour-
age collusion and reduce efficiency. The challenge however, is that there is no 
consensus on the best variable for measuring market structure in banking.
 3.1.2 Measures of market contestability
This approach assesses competitive conditions in terms of contestability. Vari-
ables like regulatory indicators of entry requirements, the presence of foreign 
ownership, formal and informal entry barriers and activity restrictions measure 
the threat of entry in the sector and thus its contestability through the degree of 
entry and exit (see for example, Daude & Pascal 2015).
 3.3.3 Direct measures of competition: the H-statistic
The third approach measures the intensity of competition directly, in the way 
prices or outputs respond to costs. Most recent studies of banking use the so-
called H-statistic, based on the Panzar and Rosse methodology, which proxies 
the reaction of output to input prices (Panzar & Rosse, 1987). The H-statistic is 
calculated by summing the estimated elasticities of revenue to factor prices; a 
value of one indicating perfect competition, a value of zero (or less) indicates 
monopoly and intermediate values indicate the degree of monopolistic compe-
tition (Bikker & Haaf, 2002). Other studies (for example, Jimenez et al., 2013) 
use the Lerner index, which expresses market power as the difference between 
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the market price and the marginal cost divided by the output price. The index 
ranges from a high of 1 to a low of 0, with higher numbers implying greater 
market power.
Despite that theoretical foundation for direct measures is stronger than for 
structural measures, direct measures have drawbacks. For instance, the H-sta-
tistic imposes restrictive assumptions on banks’ cost functions. Its conclusion 
that increases in input prices make total revenue and marginal costs not to move 
together in imperfectly competitive markets is only valid if the industry is in 
equilibrium, which in practice is very rarely the case.  Its  single  measure  ne-
glects  differences  among  banks  like  size (which is of great concern in South 
Africa),  product  or geographic  differentiation.  The Lerner index is a better 
way to distinguish among the different products, but it has the problem that it 
requires information on prices and marginal costs, which is very difficult to 
gather. For reasons highlighted here, we adopt the SCP approach and model 
HHI for the South African banking sector, with data available from the SARB 
annual reports.
3.2 Competition and risk-taking theory
Increased competition in the banking sector is typically seen as a threat to the 
solvency of financial institutions and the stability of the banking sector. The un-
derlying idea is that when banks compete heavily in the deposit market, interest 
rates fall and the franchise value decreases (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990). As 
banks have less to lose in the case of default, their incentives to take on extra 
risk increase. In an influential theoretical paper, Boyd and de Nicolo (2005) 
challenge the above view. They show that as competition declines, banks earn 
more rents in the loan markets by charging higher loan rates, which however, 
imply higher bankruptcy risk for borrowers. Then, within a moral hazard frame-
work, borrowers optimally increase their own risk of failure, which naturally 
leads to financial instability. Other studies also emphasize the importance of the 
loan market, although they do so from a credit risk perspective. For instance, 
Gehrig (1998) showed that competition decreases screening efforts, thus wors-
ening the quality of the loan portfolio.
On the other hand, the “franchise value” paradigm for bank risk-taking, both 
with and without government regulation, is well established in the banking liter-
ature. Simply stated, the idea is that banks limit their risk-taking in order to pro-
tect the quasi-monopoly rents granted by their government charters. Increased 
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competition would erode these rents and the value of the charters, which would 
likely lead to greater bank risk-taking and greater financial instability (Jimenez, 
Lopez, & Saurina, 2013).
One of the earliest papers in this literature was by Marcus (1984), who used 
a one-period model to show that franchise value declines as a bank engages in 
riskier policies. Chan et al. (1986) showed that increased competition erodes the 
surplus that banks can earn by identifying high-quality borrowers. The reduc-
tion in value leads banks to reduce their screening of potential borrowers and, 
thus, overall portfolio credit quality declines. Keeley (1990), following Furlong 
and Keeley (1989), used a state preference model with two periods to show ex-
plicitly that a decline in franchise value increases bank risk-taking. Besanko and 
Thakor (1993) showed that increased competition erodes informational rents 
originated from relationship banking and leads to greater risk-taking by banks.
In a context of asymmetric information, Marquez (2002) showed that an in-
crease in the number of banks in a market disperses the borrower-specific infor-
mation and results in both higher funding costs and greater access to credit for 
low-quality borrowers.
Using a dynamic optimization model with an infinite horizon, Suarez (1994) 
showed a trade-off between market power and solvency. If the market power of 
the bank decreases, the incentive to engage in riskier policies increases signifi-
cantly. As the franchise value of the bank is a component of bankruptcy costs, 
it should encourage the bank to carry out prudent policies that increase the sol-
vency of the bank. Matutes and Vives (1996, 2000) showed in a framework of 
imperfect competition (i.e., product differentiation) that higher market power 
reduces a bank’s default probability.
Hellmann et al. (2000) showed in a dynamic model of moral hazard that com-
petition can have a negative impact on prudent bank behaviour. Capital require-
ments are not sufficient to reduce the gambling incentives in the system, and 
deposit rate controls need to be added as an additional regulatory instrument. 
Building on that, Repullo (2004) used a dynamic model of imperfect banking 
competition to show that more competition (i.e., lower bank margins) leads to 
more risk-taking in the absence of regulation, risk-based capital requirements 
were found to effectively control the risk-shifting incentives in that model.
As an interesting alternative to the franchise value paradigm, Boyd and De 
Nicolo (BDN, 2005) developed a model, modifying one presented by Allen and 
Gale (2000), where an increase in bank market power both in the loan and de-
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posit markets translates into higher loan rates charged to borrowers. In a mor-
al hazard environment as per Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), entrepreneurs facing 
higher interest rates on their loans would choose to increase the risk of their 
investment projects, a practice that would lead to more problem loans and a 
higher bankruptcy risk for banks. They find a monotonic declining relationship 
between competition (measured as the number of banks lending in a market) 
and bank risk; that is, as the number of banks and competition increases, the 
level of bank risk would decline.
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (MMR) (2010) extend the BDN model by in-
troducing imperfect correlation across borrowing firms. Under this assumption, 
two potentially countervailing effects of bank competition are introduced. As in 
the BDN model, the “risk-shifting” effect captures the result that more compe-
tition leads to lower loan rates, lower firm default probabilities, and improved 
bank risk measures. However, the lower rates should also reduce all firms’ inter-
est payments and thus overall bank revenues, which should lead to potentially 
greater bank risk and bank failures. This effect is defined as the “margin” effect 
by the authors. 
In the MMR model, a U-shaped relationship between bank competition (mea-
sured as the number of banks) and the risk of bank failure is found to represent 
the net effect of these two forces. The risk shifting effect is shown to dominate 
in very concentrated markets, such that increased entry improves bank risk mea-
sures. In already competitive markets, the margin effect dominates such that fur-
ther entry worsens bank risk. Thus, the lowest degrees of bank risk are obtained 
in loan markets with moderate levels of competition. The authors importantly 
found that the results hold whether the variable of interest is loan supply or 
pricing, thus expanding the set of circumstances under which the model applies.
4. Empirical literature
Jimenez et al. (2013) studied how competition affects bank risk-taking using 
data from the Spanish banking system. This was done to test the MMR mod-
el which postulates that a nonlinear relationship theoretically exists between 
bank competition and risk-taking in the loan market. After controlling for both 
the macroeconomic conditions and bank characteristics, they found evidence 
for non-linear relationship using standard measures of market concentration in 
the loan and deposit markets. Using the direct market power measures such as 
the Lerner indices, the empirical results where more supportive of the MMR 
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hypothesis. Though we do not intend to run a horse race of the models, we find 
this paper informative in modelling risk taking and concentration within the 
banking sector. 
On the other hand, Levy Yeyati and Micco (2007) analysed concentration 
and foreign penetration in Latin American banking sectors with the main fo-
cus on the impact on competition and risk taking. They used the H-statistic as 
the measure of competitiveness. The results of the study revealed that bank 
risks increased as bank competition increased (low concentration) in eight Latin 
American countries. This implies that stiff competition, market contestability, 
increases risk taking and in line with our study this would mean low concen-
tration high risk taking incentive. Given the high concentration with the bank-
ing sector, this could explain the resistance from financial crisis shown by the 
South African banks during the 2008/9 global financial crisis that paralyzed 
some economies.
In similar vein, Martins and Alencar (2010) investigated banking concentra-
tion, profitability and systematic risk; testing an indirect contagion approach. 
The findings of the study show evidence of the existence of an indirect conta-
gion channel in Brazil. However the study found out that a more concentrated 
financial system is associated with an increase in potential of systematic risk 
among banks with similar characteristics. The South African banking system 
could bring forth interesting results given the level of concentration as well as 
uniqueness of the entities. 
Agoraki et al. (2011) looked at the relationship between regulations, com-
petition, and risk-taking in the Central and Eastern European banking sectors 
between 1994 and 2005. They found that market power is negatively linked 
with the risk taking behaviour of banks, whereas capital requirements and su-
pervisory power are effective devices in monitoring risk-taking since they aug-
ment equity to capital ratios and decrease credit risk. Lastly, they found out 
that incentives and tools that improve market self-monitoring also encourage 
credit-risk reduction.
A positive effect of bank concentration on financial distress was found by 
Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2009) examining the impact of bank concentration 
on bank financial distress using a balanced panel of commercial banks in the 
EU-25 over a sample period running from 2003 to 2007.  This is contrary to our 
hypothesis here. The shareholder value ratio which falls below the threshold of 
the empirical distribution of risk adjustment was used as a proxy for financial 
distress. 
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Kick and Prieto (2013) investigated the bank competition-stability in German 
over the period 1994 to 2010. In line with Agoraki et al. (2011), their findings 
using the Lerner Index to proxy the bank specific market power support the 
view that market power reduces bank’s risk taking incentive. However, when 
considering competition through local market share using the Boone indicator, 
they found a strong support that increased competition lowers the riskiness of 
banks.
From theory and empirical studies two hypotheses stand out: concentra-
tion-stability and the concentration-fragility hypotheses. The former posits that 
in a highly concentrated market banks with greater market power may force 
the market to charge higher loan rates in order to yield higher profits. Such 
high profits have a positive marginal effect acting as buffer against loan losses 
thereby increasing the franchise value and reduce risk appetite of the individual 
bank. On the other hand, bank supervision and monitoring is easier in highly 
concentrated market as only a few large banks hold diversified and complex 
portfolios. South Africa has a highly concentrated sector and repelled the global 
financial crisis fairly well than many of its counterparts, so did Canada and Aus-
tralia with concentrated financial systems credited for such outcomes (World 
Bank-2013). According to Bordo, Rockoff and Redish (1994) history show that 
the UK banking sector was highly concentrated between 1840 and 1940 and no 
major disruptions to the system were recorded.
On the contrary, concentration-fragility hypothesis argue that a highly con-
centrated market is prone to bank fragility. According to OECD (2011) the hard 
knock felt by highly concentrated banking systems of Switzerland and the Neth-
erlands during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis era is testament to this hy-
pothesis. Due to weak competition in a concentrated market, the large bank(s) 
exploit their monopoly (oligopoly) power and charge higher interest rates on 
loans which will increase moral hazard and adverse selection problems leading 
to greater default risk.  This is in line with the null hypothesis the study seeks 
to test, rejecting the null would be in support of the concentration-stability hy-
pothesis above. 
As a result of this relativity of the effect of sector concentration on risk tak-
ing, there is no consensus in literature, and for South Africa, there are no known 
studies that have modelled this relationship. This study immensely contributes 
to literature by performing a focused test on the relationship between one of the 
key features of the South African banking sector, concentration, and bank risk 
taking.
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5. Research methodology, data and empirical estimation techniques
The study sought to investigate the quantitative pressure of sector concentration 
on risk appetite of banks in South Africa. Based on availability of data, a sample 
of seven banks from the nineteen commercials banks in operation where consid-
ered over a three-and-half year period, forty months’ observations for each bank 
between 2008 and 2011. The size of the sample is determined by availability of 
data, which is a serious constrain in South African banking sector research (see 
also Maredza & Ikhide, 2013; Mishi and Tsegaye, 2012). Bank specific data 
were sourced from the D900 returns for each bank to the central bank of South 
Africa. The data include time series and cross sectional data, therefore pooled 
into a panel data set and estimated using Panel Data regression techniques. The 
study uses panel data regression model in the analysis. The technique of panel 
data estimation takes care of the problem of heterogeneity in the seven banks 
selected for the study. Also, by combining time series of cross-section observa-
tion, panel data give more informative data, more variability, less co-linearity 
among the variables, more degree of freedom and more efficiency (Gujarati & 
Sangeetha, 2007). Bank sector concentration data was obtained from the South 
African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletins over the period of study
 5.1 Model specification
To examine the hypothesis regarding the effect of banking sector concentration 
on bank risk taking, we estimate the general regression following (Jimenez, 
Lopez, & Saurina, 2
RISKit= f(CONCENTATRION INDEXit;MACROECO.CONDITIONSit;BANK CONTROL VARSit      1
Our dependent variable measure of risk-taking is a bank’s commercial 
non-performing loan (NPL) ratio, which is an ex-post measure of credit risk. 
Our main focus is on commercial credit risk. It is the primary driver of risk for 
most banks, although other risks obviously exist.
The concentration structure of the market is measured by the Herfindahl in-
dex, (HHI) which measures the size of firms in relation to the industry. It is an 
indicator of the amount of competition among firms. The index is defined as the 
sum of the squares of the market shares of the firms within the industry (Mau-
dos & Guevara, 2008). The negative association between market concentration 
and bank risk taking has been established, among many others, by Matutes and 
Vives (1996) and Repullo (2004).
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The banking sector does not exist in vacuum, macroeconomic policies and fac-
tors can influence their risk appetite and possibly influence the effect of con-
centration on risk taking. For macroeconomic factors we control for monetary 
policy, proxied by interest rate (ir) (repo rate in this case); while for bank specif-
ic characteristics we used size, total factor productivity efficiency scores (tfpe), 
exposure through capital market investments (expo). The econometric model 
estimated in STATA is stated as:
CRit=α+β1SIZEit+β2TFPEit+  β3HHIit+ β4IRt+β5SIZEit*HHIit+β6EXPOit+εit                           2
6. Empirical results and discussion
Panel estimations were conducted given the advantages that it allows the con-
trol for variables that cannot be observed or measured like differences in busi-
ness practices across banks as well as variables such as monetary policy that 
change over time but not across entities. In essence individual heterogeneity 
can be controlled. Firstly by running a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) 
we obtained:
TabLe 1: pooLed ordinary LeasT squares esTimaTion resuLTs
Dep. Var: cr Coef. Std. Err. T P> |t|
Size -510.9733 170.2346 -3.00 0.003
Tfpe 6.0385 6.1089 0.99 0.324
Hhi -55914.3 16881.12 -3.31 0.001
Ir 1.814124 1.937 0.94 0.350
Size*hhi 2731.496 902.414 3.03 0.003
expo -4.2037 3.404 -1.23 0.218
cons 10524.15 3173.114 3.32 0.001
Number of observations 280 Adj R-squared 0.0770
Prob>F 0.0001
From this analysis, size, industry concentration and interaction between the 
two are significant. With the latter positively related to credit risk. As size in-
creases, credit risk exposure declines. This may be explained by availability of 
resources as cushion, diversification of income sources as most of the smaller 
banks concentrate on one business line. With concentration, as the industry be-
come highly concentrated, risk taking declines in line with the findings of Levy 
and Micco (2007)  Marquez (2002), Matutes and Vives (2000) arguing that with 
high competition (low concentration) borrow-specific information is dispersed 
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leading to higher funding costs and adverse selection problem, and thus greater 
default risk.  In addition, this maybe because in such a sector, leaders are clearly 
known and acknowledged to the extent that fierce competition that expose enti-
ties to credit risk will be eliminated. 
Interestingly, given the nature of our data we can control for individual specif-
ic effects by including dummies and compare the results with the simple POLS 
reported above. 
TabLe 2: LeasT square dummy variabLe modeL (Lsdv)
Dep. Var: cr Coef. Std. Err. t P> |t|
size -680.9635   158.1448    -4.31   0.000    
tfpe 16.26183   10.76656     1.51   0.132
hhi -73138.73   15616.42    -4.68   0.000
Ir 1.855869   1.555303     1.19   0.234
Size*hhi 3341.823   829.4746     4.03   0.000
expo 22.65483   5.295059     4.28   0.000
Bank
African Bank -53.51501   11.68011    -4.58   0.000    
Capitec -113.6344   11.65964    -9.75   0.000
FNB -19.27343   8.411619    -2.29   0.023
Investec -54.62559   9.053473    -6.03   0.000
Nedbank 5.773038   5.789218     1.00   0.320
Sasfin -172.2301   14.95252   -11.52   0.000
cons 14386.92   2944.518     4.89   0.000
Number of observations 280 Adj R-squared 0.4119
Prob>F 0.0000
Here the effects of explanatory variables are mediated by the differences 
across banks. Meaning by including dummy for each bank the pure effect of 
exogenous factors is estimated through controlling for the unobserved heteroge-
neity. Each dummy is absorbing the effects particular to each bank. The results 
in table 3 below justify the inclusion of dummy variable given the effect on the 
results, also revealed by an increase in the explanatory power of the models as 
shown by a sharp increase in r-squared (to over 43%) and adjusted r-squared (of 
41%) from as low values as 10%. 
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TabLe 3: ComparinG poLs and Lsdv
Variable ols ols_dum     
size -510.97335** -680.96354***  
tfpe 6.0385072 16.261826     
hhi -55914.304** -73138.727***  
ir 1.8141244 1.8558691     
Size*hhi 2731.4958** 3341.8227***  
Expo -4.2037228 22.654832***  
Bank
African Bank -53.515011***  
Capitec -113.63436***  
FNB -19.273428*    
Investec -54.625591***  
Nedbank 5.7730379     
Sasfin -172.23013***  
 _cons 10524.151** 14386.918***  
N 280 280     
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
With specific reference to panel data, there are two key techniques available, 
fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) assumption, with the former used 
whenever the interest is in analysing the impact of variables that vary over time 
and the latter variation across entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated 
with the predictor or independent variables included in the model.
Under fixed effect assumption the time-invariant characteristics are unique to 
the individual bank and should not be correlated with other individual character-
istics. Each entity is different therefore the entity’s error term and the constant 
should not be correlated with the others. If the error terms are correlated then 
FE is not suitable since inferences may not be correct and there is need to model 
that relationship probably using RE. This is determined through the Hausman 
test.
According to Green (2000), in order to choose between fixed or random ef-
fects a Hausman test is run with the null hypothesis that the preferred model 
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is random effects versus the alternative the fixed effects. Given that the test is 
significant, (Prob>Chi2= 0.0000) we reject the null and therefore estimate the 
model assuming fixed effects. Running the panel assuming fixed effects justified 
by the analysis above, we get the following results:
TabLe 4: Fixed eFFeCTs modeL 
 Dep. Var: cr Coef. Std.Err.      t P>|t|
 size -680.9635 158.1448 -4.31 0.000
 tfpe 16.26183 10.76656 1.51 0.132
 hhi -73138.73 15616.42 -4.68 0.000
 ir 1.855869 1.555303 1.19 0.234
Size*hhi 3341.823 829.4746 4.03 0.000
 expo 22.65483 5.295059 4.28 0.000
 _cons 14328.7 2945.649 4.86 0.000
N 280
With the Prob>F being less than 5%, our model fits well, as all the coeffi-
cients in the model are different from zero. Given the two-tail p-values: size, 
hhi, size*hhi and expo all have significant effect on credit risk. The same con-
clusions can be drawn from the t values at 95% confidence interval. Further-
more the intra-class correlation (‘rho’) tells us that 87% of the variance in credit 
risk is due to differences across panels. 
Of the variables that have a significant effect on credit risk, size of each bank 
and our key variable level of concentration within the sector have a negative 
influence. This means that when we move from small banks, in terms of market 
share, to bigger banks, the extent of credit risk exposure declines. It implies 
that large banks better manage their operations and have lower credit risk. The 
results corroborate the works of Kick et al. (2013). This explains our assertion 
that smaller banks accumulate more risk through efforts to gain market share. 
For example, most of the smaller banks in South Africa have been observed as 
creating business through consolidating loans, and lending generously to attract 
more customers, the focus being on quantity rather that quality of clients,(Leli-
fi, 2013. The banks, especially Capitec and African bank have been asked to 
re-assess their lending criteria to avoid what has been referred to as ‘reckless’ 
lending, (Arde, 2013; Lelifi, 2013; Mittner, 2013).  Such finding also corrobo-
rates the works of Agoraki et al. (2011) in Brazil, an emerging market as South 
Africa, with both belonging to the BRICS3 group. 
3 A group of emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
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With regards to concentration measure, the more concentrated the sector be-
comes the lower the credit risk. This seeming paradox could be explained by 
the fact that, in a highly concentrated market, sector leaders are well known and 
acknowledged, limiting competition and hence risk taking activities. Relational 
lending, for example would be key to driving success through building customer 
franchise (franchise value paradigm). This is in line with the concentration-sta-
bility hypothesis. However, this contradicts with the findings in Cipollini and 
Fiordelisi (2009) who concluded on a positive effect of bank concentration on 
financial distress. 
When size has been interacted by concentration measure (size*hhi) the effect 
becomes positive, implying that as size of banks increase, in an increasingly 
highly concentrated industry risk taking increase. Concentration, that is, having 
few very big banks controlling very few assets within the sector comes at a cost 
of increasing credit risk. This refutes the concentration-stability hypothesis up-
held in Bordo et al. (1994) and World Bank (2013) and supports the concentra-
tion-fragility hypothesis as evidenced in Switzerland and Netherlands (OECD, 
2011). Furthermore and Rath, Mishra and Al Yahyaei (2014) concluded that big-
ger banks in highly concentrated industry contribute to financial instability.  For 
there to be acknowledged leaders in the market, high risky activities could have 
been undertaken, so as some banks grow to be sector leaders, thus at the same 
time increasing concentration within the sector, credit risk will be increasing. 
On the other hand, when a bank is exposed to more risk through its invest-
ments (expo variable), there is a tendency of accumulating more credit risk. 
Assumedly caught in “sunk-cost fallacy” the bank’s management believes fur-
ther exposure will help recoup losses. Furthermore, weak competition from the 
minor entities create an opportunity for the bigger banks to exploit the market 
by charging higher interest rates on loans which will expose them to greater 
default risk and adverse selection in a manner depicted in Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) model.  The results imply that the process of having a concentrated mar-
ket results in incurring high credit risk of which greater credit risk exposure 
may destabilise a sector. However, once industry leaders are clearly established, 
accumulation of risk declines. There should be close monitoring of how bank 
business is conducted as smaller banks seem inclined to unseating bigger banks, 
albeit at a cost of engaging in risky activities. The National credit regulator 
should have a closer monitoring to ensure reckless landing is curtailed.  
On the other hand, for robustness check we looked at the effect of including 
the dummy. According to Hamilton (2006), although the demean data (areg 
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command) output is less informative than the regression one, nonetheless areg 
has the advantage of speeding up exploratory working, providing quick feed-
back whether a dummy variable approach is worthwhile. Here, as shown in Ta-
ble 6 below, the test is significant, also indicating the dummy variable controlled 
is worthwhile. 
TabLe 5: areG esTimaTions: Linear reGression, absorbinG indiCaTors
Dep. Var cr Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
        size -680.9635 158.1448 -4.31 0.000
        tfpe 16.26183 10.76656 1.51 0.132
         hhi -73138.73 15616.42 -4.68 0.000
          ir 1.855869 1.555303 1.19 0.234
    Size*hhi 3341.823 829.4746 4.03 0.000
        expo 22.65483 5.295059 4.28 0.000
       _cons 14328.7 2945.649 4.86 0.000
       bank F(6, 267) =     26.911   0.000
Finally we econometrically compare our models to see the power of each and 
as a robustness check mechanism to ensure that the results we presented from 
the chosen model can be used to draw policy conclusion. 
TabLe 7: ComparinG Fixed eFFeCT assumpTion, oLs and areG 
    Variable Fixed         Ols      areg
        Size -680.96354*** -510.97335** -680.96354***  
        Tfpe 16.261826 6.0385072 16.261826     
         Hhi -73138.727*** -55914.304** -73138.727***  
         Ir 1.8558691 1.8141244 1.8558691     
    Size*hhi 3341.8227*** 2731.4958** 3341.8227***  
        Expo 22.654832*** -4.2037228 22.654832***  
       _cons 14328.703*** 10524.151** 14328.703***  
           N 280        280                         280
          r2 .41367288 .0968834 .43721883     
        r2_a .3873211 .07703469 .41192529     
                      legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Based on the results reported in Table 7, the fixed effect assumption performs 
better than the OLS as results from fixed effect model (as well as the areg mod-
el) can be interpreted with 99 percent confidence.
6.1 Testing for cross-sectional dependence/contemporaneous correlation: using 
Pasaran CD test
Although, according to Baltagi (2001), cross-sectional dependence is more of 
an issue in macro panels with long time series (over 20-30 years) than in micro 
panels it is worth checking here.  Pasaran CD (cross-sectional dependence) test 
is used to test whether the residuals are correlated across entities. Cross-sec-
tional dependence can lead to bias in tests results (also called contemporaneous 
correlation). The null hypothesis is that residuals are not correlated. The tests 
results are presented below. 
TabLe 8: pasaran Cd TesT
pesaran’s test of cross sectional independence =     1.396, Pr = 0.1627
 Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.400
The reported Pr =0.1627>0.05 show absence of cross-sectional dependence.
From these results conclusions can be drawn that give insight to policy mak-
ers and practitioners. 
7. Summary and conclusion
The paper set to estimate the effect of concentration on risk taking based on the 
observation that some banks seem to care more about market share regardless 
of exposure to risk. This is a threat to the industry. The main contribution of 
this study was to perform a focused test on the relationship between two of the 
key features of the South African banking sector, concentration, and bank risk 
taking.  The study found that smaller banks indeed assume more risk than bigger 
banks in the highly concentrated South African banking sector. However, when 
clear sector leaders are acknowledged, that is, when the sector is extremely 
concentrated, risk accumulation is reversed. When size has been interacted by 
concentration measure (size*hhi) the effect becomes positive, implying that as 
size of banks increase, in an increasingly highly concentrated industry risk tak-
ing increase; confirming the concentration fragility hypothesis.
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The analysis was done based on the assumption of fixed effects as revealed in 
the data through Haussmann tests, that is assuming that the time-invariant char-
acteristics are unique to the individual bank and are not correlated with other 
individual characteristics. Each bank has been assumed to be different. 
The dominant thinking within this field is that franchise value derived from 
market power and reduced competition has a key role to play in limiting the 
riskiness of individual banks. This paradigm is appealing to both academicians 
and bank supervisors. This corroborate  our findings as large banks assume less 
risk, possibly because shareholders and management limit risk exposure to pre-
serve the bank’s franchise value. However, for smaller banks, there is trade-off 
between preserving franchise value and market share, leading to risk taking; 
there is limited franchise value to preserve given that market power is one un-
derlying source for this value. In South Africa, only four banks control over 
84% of the market. 
Again a growing paradigm has been put forward by Boyd and De Nicolo 
(2005) which posits that the effect of market concentration on banks is ambig-
uous, relying on the net effect across loan and deposit sectors. This is also of 
interest to the South African banking market, and thus results presented here. 
Majority of the banks focus on specialised activities that see them participating 
less in the deposit taking market. For example Capitec and African bank are 
key leaders in the unsecured lending market compared to the big four that have 
a strong standing in the deposit market and offer secured lending. Therefore, 
banks that concentrate in the loan market, the small banks in the case of South 
Africa, end up having increased lending rates that will raise borrowers’ debt 
loads as well as increased default probabilities and thus incentive to engage in 
riskier projects- moral hazard argument.
Despite the robust results, it is worth noting that the study suffers a limitation 
of unavailability of data for all banks in South Africa (Mishi & Tsegaye, 2012; 
Maredza & Ikhide, 2013). However the considered banks represent greater por-
tion of the market, given than the big four only, account for over 84% of market 
share, adding Capitec alone will take the market share to over 95% of the South 
African market. For future studies it will be interesting to control for type of 
ownership, funding structure as well as business model of the individual banks; 
or to investigate what matter for bank stability.
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